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Is Tech M&A Value-Additive?
Abstract
Given rising M&A deal volume across all high-tech subsectors, the ability to measure post-acquisition
performance becomes critical. Despite this growth, the relevant academic literature is severely lacking
(Kohers and Kohers 2000). Using an event-study approach, I find that acquirers and targets both realize
statistically significant day-0 abnormal returns (1.23% [p<0.1] and 8.1% [p<0.01], respectively). As positive
stock returns signal positive growth prospects in a semi-strong efficient market, AR regressions found
that firms' technological relatedness, deal financing, purchase price premiums, and the relative book to
market ratio, explained most variance. Overall, high-tech transactions are value-additive for both targets
and acquirers.
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I. Introduction
The deployment of services, compute power, storage, and development platforms
through the cloud heralds robust growth prospects for the internet, software, and IT
services sectors. With an estimated 20% compounded annual growth rate until 2020 and
fast product cycles (Wall Street Journal 2011), cloud computing is driving vendors to
acquire firms that aid IT/rack space consolidation, product-cross selling, and patent
portfolio development. Total deal value rose by 100 percent across all tech sectors to
$107.1 billion in 2010, alongside a 73% increase in deal volume to 165 total transactions
(PWC 2011). Within this context, the ability to measure post-acquisition performance
becomes critical.
On a general level, mergers and acquisitions can leverage scalable business
models through enhancing operational efficiency (e.g. lowering average fixed costs
through reductions in administrative overhead, IT/R&D overlap, and facility closures) or
reinvent business models by exposure to new customers, markets, or products (Harvard
Business Review 2011). Through such synergies, M&A allows the sum of parts to exceed
the standalone valuations of both firms, enabling bidders to offer hefty purchase price
premiums; in any transaction, these projected differences are accounted for by goodwill
and definite-life intangible assets.
Although high-tech M&A has received much attention from the financial press,
the academic literature regarding these acquisitions is severely lacking (Kohers and
Kohers 2000). By analyzing all domestic, high-tech, publically-announced M&A
transactions from November 10, 2002 to November 10, 2011, my study will determine
the shareholder wealth implications following announcements of high-technology
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acquisitions. More specifically, I presume that both targets and acquirers will experience
statistically significant and positive abnormal returns (AR). I use a standard event study
methodology to ascertain abnormal returns by subtracting actual returns from riskadjusted expected returns that are benchmarked to a CRSP value-weighted market index.
If abnormal returns are significant, I will proceed to develop multiple regression models
for targets and acquirers. For acquirers, I will regress abnormal returns against percentage
of cash used to finance the deal, percentage of purchase price allocated to goodwill and
acquired intangibles (i.e. the purchase price premium), relative market cap, concentration
(a measure of technological complementarity), relative book to market value, industry
subsector, seasonality, and year of transaction. Because transaction premiums flow
directly to the target shareholders, abnormal returns for targets will only be regressed
against the percentage of cash used to finance the deal, the logarithm of the purchase
price premium, industry subsector, seasonality, and year of transaction. For both firms,
cumulative abnormal returns are also analyzed to assess the significance of drifts,
reversals, and overall market efficient pricing of firms before and after acquisition
announcements.
As the first paper to focus on high-tech merger-related abnormal returns using
only a 21st century dataset, I hope to update the 20th century data dominated and industryagnostic event study literature base. With regards to the second phase of the study, I
introduce several improvements to AR and CAR multiple regression models: first, I
control for industry subsector; second, I incorporate a purchase price premium regressor
that measures the impact of acquired intangible value on acquirer returns; and third, I
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adapt the technology concentration index (usually reserved for software companies) to
encompass acquisitions by any high-tech firm.

II. Literature Review
The literature surrounding M&A value creation is extensive and primarily makes
use of short-term event studies to assess the significance of observed abnormal returns
relative to the expected normal returns of target and acquirer firms during the period of
the acquisition (Bruner 2003, Duso et al. 2010). Crucial to this methodology’s success is
the assumption of semi-strong market efficiency (EMH), whereby stock prices reflect the
present discounted value of all future returns and therefore immediately adjust to new
public information (Fama 1970, 1976, Jensen 1978, Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Any
variation in actual versus expected risk-adjusted returns is thus attributed to the effect of
an M&A announcement on the firm’s expected returns.
Burton Malkiel (2011) reiterates his support of semi-strong EMH despite the 2008
financial crisis. Although prices immediately reflect all public information, it does not
mean the information is accurate. The diversity of research analyst estimates,
complicated by the additional sensitivity tables incorporated into their DCF valuations,
makes determining a single, true value impossible. What EMH guarantees is that if
information is public, then it will be incorporated into stock prices. With an M&A
announcement, purchase premiums are clearly delineated, and thus markets are expected
to respond in kind.
Robert Bruner (2003) devotes an entire chapter of his book Applied Mergers and
Acquisitions to consolidating the mass of research surrounding M&A value creation. Of
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the 120 event study papers analyzed, all suggest that targets receive significantly positive
market returns while acquirers receive zero adjusted returns, with 66% of studies
reporting acquirers earning slightly positive, though insignificant, abnormal returns
(Bruner 2003). This markedly differs from the common view that “corporate marriages
only rarely end in bliss.” (Suroweicki 2008)
Targets typically experience statistically significant positive returns regardless of
time period, if nothing else due to the premium above current share price that acquirers
offer (Siougle et al. 2010). In fact, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1990) find that
unsuccessful/blocked mergers cause targets to return to their pre-merger share price,
indirectly showing how the initial premium is the main determinant of post-acquisition
abnormal returns. Table 1 summarizes the most highly cited studies on target shareholder
returns and finds that a majority of firms experience statistically significant positive
returns (Table 1):
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Table 1: Review of Studies on Post-Acquisition Target Returns*
Study

Sample Period

Langetieg
1929-69
(1978)
Bradley, Desai,
1964-84
Kim (1988)
1962-1980
Dennis and
McConnell
(1986)
Bannerjee and
1978-87
Owers (1992)
1971-82
Kaplan and
Weisbach
(1992)
1963-88
Berkovitch and
Narayanan
(1993)
1963-96
Maquieira,
Megginson,
and Nail
(1998)
Mulherin
1962-97
(2000)
DeLong (2001)
1988-95
*adapted from Bruner (2003)

(-120,0)

% Positive
Returns
(Day 0)
71.6%

Cumulative
Abnormal
Return (CAR)
+10.63%

236

(-5,5)

95%

+31.77%

76

(-1,0)

70%

+8.56%

33

(-1,0)

85%

N/A

209

(-5,5)

94.7%

+26.9%

330

(-5,5)

95.8%

N/A

55

(-60,60)

83%

+38.08%

202

(-1,0)

76%

+10.14%

280

(-10,1)

88.6%

+16.61%

Sample Size

Event
Window

149

All studies (regardless of time period assessed) report significant cumulative
abnormal returns within the pre-announcement day event windows, indicating a steady
price run-up prior to the day-0 announcement. Dodd (1980) finds a 6.59% appreciation in
target shares starting 10 days prior to the event, while Keown and Pinkerton (1981)
isolate that nearly half of the total price appreciation occurs starting 25 days before.
Dennis and McConnell (1986) and Asquith (1983) also find most cumulative abnormal
returns beginning 20 days before the event. Duso et al. (2010) and Andrade et al. (2001)
argue for a shorter event window as per 21st century data, finding that most returns
accumulate within 5 days of the announcement.
Two traditionally opposing views – the information leakage and market
anticipation hypotheses – are best merged to explain pre-announcement cumulative
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abnormal returns. The former hypothesis argues that as insiders buy shares, brokers either
mimic the unusual trading patterns or react to information leaked via word-of-mouth
(Sanders and Zdanowicz 1992); the market anticipation model applies leakage to a larger
investor base, arguing that gradual release of information (albeit still private) influences
share appreciation (Jensen and Ruback 1983). In both cases, the threshold between
private and public information is blurred.
In the post-announcement period, Siougle et al. (2010) find that markets generally
react efficiently, with short-term reversals occurring only when high-magnitude events
cause investor overreaction. Ketcher and Jordan (1994) find that the market quickly
corrects for overreaction as almost all of the short-term reversal in stock prices occurs 1
day after the event. Kohers and Kohers (2001) apply the overreaction hypothesis to hightech acquirers. They argue that complex R&D and tech-related synergies increase
investor uncertainty over the true stock price, ultimately resulting in significant “market
errors in judgment” that are corrected by longer-term price reversals (Kohers and Kohers
2001). Daniel et al. (1998) confirm that overreaction is more prevalent in cases of
uncertain information, even when all financial details regarding a transaction may be
disclosed. Though Kohers and Kohers (2001) studied price reversals over 3 years, I
expect similar reversals to hold in the post-announcement event window in cases where
the percentage of purchase price allocated to goodwill and intangibles is significantly
high.
By analyzing 126,386 earnings announcements from 1988-2005, Rusticus et al.
(2008) found that larger bid-ask spreads resulted in greater post-announcement drift. And
as transaction costs (e.g. bid-ask spread, shorting cost, etc.) vary inversely with firm size
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(Stoll and Whaley 1983), it logically follows that firm size impacts the absolute value of
drift (Bernard and Thomas 1989).
Besides accounting for post-acquisition drift, firm size determines abnormal
returns for acquirers and targets as larger-cap firms need a larger dollar excess to generate
the same percentage abnormal return as smaller firms. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins
(1983) report that the returns to buyers in mergers with relative partner size (target
market cap/acquirer market cap) greater than or equal to 10% was 2.4% greater than
those below 10%. However, excessively large targets make integration difficult,
exhibiting a curvilinear effect on acquirer abnormal returns (Hitt et al. 2009).
Overall, shareholders of the bidder firm do not experience significant abnormal
returns, with most experiencing slightly positive (Dodd and Ruback 1977, Jarell and
Poulsen 1989, Malatesta 1983, Kohers and Kohers 2000) or negative surprises (Houston
et al. 2001, Eckbo et al. 2000, Morck et al. 1990, Walker 2000, DeLong, 2001, Goergen
and Renneboog 2004) depending on firm-specific characteristics. Table 2 provides a brief
summary.
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Table 2: Review of Studies on Post-Acquisition Acquirer Returns*

(0,0)

% Positive
Returns
(Day 0)
N/A

Cumulative
Abnormal
Return (CAR)
2.83%

170

(-20,+1)

N/A

3.48%

1968-1986

87

(-5,5)

N/A

0%

1987-96

1634

(-1,0)

N/A

1.44%

1984-95

304

(-1,5)

N/A

1.26%

1990-2000

3135

(-2,2)

N/A

1.77%

1985-2000

98

(-1,0)

53%

0.06%

1970-77
1979-85

60
352

(-1,0)
(-1,0)

N/A
37%

-1.09%
-0.8%

1979-84

50

(-5,5)

N/A

-2.2%

1964-83

390

(-40,0)

N/A

-0.3%

1961-1993

366

(-1,0)

N/A

-0.07%

1988-95

280

(-10,1)

33.6%

-1.68%

1985-1999

1190

(-5,0)

N/A

-0.96%

1982-1991
Kuipers,
Miller, and
Patel (2003)
*adapted from Bruner (2003)

138

(-1,0)

N/A

-0.92%

Study

Sample Period

Sample Size

Event
Window

Dodd and
Ruback (1977)
Asquith,
Bruner, and
Mullins (1983)
Lang, Stulz,
and Walkling
(1989)
Kohers and
Kohers (2000)
Kohers and
Kohers (2001)
Fuller, Netter,
and
Stegemoller
(2002)
Beitel et. al.
(2002)
Dodd (1980)
Jennings and
Mazzeo (1991)
Healy, Palepu,
Ruback (1992)
Eckbo and
Thornburn
(2000)
Mitchell and
Stafford (2000)
DeLong (2001)

1958-78

124

1963-79

Ghosh (2002)

A major factor in both acquirer and target returns seems to be the method of
financing. Huang and Walkling (1987), Travlos (1987), Yook (2000) and Heron and Lie
(2002) find that stock-based deals generate negative abnormal returns for acquirers while
cash-based deals have no significant impact. Asquith et. al. (1990) find a 2.6% (t=9.25)
significant difference in 2-day announcement excess returns between cash (0.2%, t=1.05)
and stock mergers (-2.4%, t=-11.60), with mixed cash/stock mergers generating a -1.47%
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excess return. Bouwman et al (2004) argue that market timing plays a major role in
choice of financing; stock market booms prompt using overvalued stock to buy target
shares, while merger waves cause managers to follow the pack for fear that inaction may
lead to rival success (hence, late-movers underperform early-movers). For targets, cash
deals generate significantly higher abnormal returns than stock deals; Asquith et al (1990)
quantify the difference at 13.38% (t=20.86). One possible explanation for this difference
may be the immediate taxability of cash, which necessitates higher investor returns
(Asquith et al. 1990).
Besides controlling for firm size and method of payment, Kohers and Kohers
(2001) also control for market perceptions of poor managerial execution (the book-tomarket ratio) using a sample of only high-technology acquisitions. Though bidders
experienced statistically significant short-term abnormal returns (2-day event period
cumulative abnormal return of 1.44%, i=1634) (Kohers and Kohers 2000), 3-year long
event studies (Kohers and Kohers 2001) revised prices downward for firms that had low
book-to-market values (known as growth, or glamour firms). This latter finding confirms
Rau and Vermaelen’s (1998) results that value acquirers (high book-to-market ratios)
outperformed growth acquirers over the long term, with the former group experiencing
16% returns compared to the latter’s 4%. Lang et al (1989), however, construe a falling
book-to-market ratio as a function of the market’s rising confidence in a firm’s
managerial performance in excess of its expected, risk-adjusted return. In the short term,
Lang et al. (1989) find that low book-to-market bidders gain the largest abnormal returns
when acquiring high book-to market targets, understood as well-managed acquirers
buying poorly-managed targets. This confidence in managerial efficiency explains the
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short-run investor overreaction found in the Kohers and Kohers (2000) study, but as
integration may fail to capture projected synergies (such as estimated growth and
earnings targets), long-run stock prices decline. I will also incorporate a relative book-tomarket ratio (target to acquirer) to account for how seamlessly the market expects postannouncement synergies to be realized; higher relative book to market ratios should
therefore have a positive impact on abnormal returns. In the case of tech M&A, however,
book to market ratios do not explain the whole story. Because many tech acquisitions
depend on revenue-enhancing synergies across different subsectors, they imply merging
firms’ culture, R&D, and strategy, and are much harder to implement than simply
managing a firm more efficiently through cost-cutting, employee reduction, or asset
divestments (Gaughan 2011).
Interestingly, method of payment was insignificant for short and long-term returns
(Kohers and Kohers 2000, 2001), indicating that investors do not differentiate between
stock and cash-financed acquisitions. However, because the 90s faced significant techrelated M&A and IPO activity, all without much concern over deal structure or company
financials (Chaudhuri and Tabrizia 1999), a large percentage of the Kohers and Kohers
(2000, 2001) 1987-1996 sample set is biased towards acquisitions from the mid-90s. In
fact, Kohers and Kohers (2000) found that by just being a technology company, bidders
experienced significant positive returns (t=2.46). Therefore, I plan to include deal
financing as a regressor in my models as investor perception, cash reserves, and
technology-sector market value have all changed since the 90s.
Despite the issues outlined above, as this is one of the few studies that observe
short-term post-acquisition abnormal returns for high-tech bidders, I predict my observed
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acquirers will also experience significant positive surprises. Unfortunately, Kohers and
Kohers did not devote any attention to deal-specific intangible value (grouped under
goodwill and acquired intangibles on the acquirer’s balance sheet), which constitutes the
largest percentage of any tech acquisition and drives most of the potential synergy (PWC
2011). Hitt et al. (2009) succinctly state, “The acquisition premium has been examined in
only a minority of M&A studies,” despite its having been identified as a “significant
variable.”
To remedy this, I will include the percentage of purchase price allocated to
goodwill (i.e. the purchase price premium) as a regressor in my multiple regression
model for acquirer return. Studies by Jennings et al. (1996) and Lys et al. (2011) confirm
that there exists a positive correlation between goodwill and long-term returns due to the
former’s definition as the present discounted value of all expected synergies. However,
both assume a linear relationship between goodwill and returns and do not take as their
reference point the M&A announcement date. Although I do not analyze long term
returns due to the variety of confounding variables involved, my study does account for
goodwill’s short-term impacts surrounding an M&A announcement. Because paying
excessively high premiums reflects overpayment (especially when bidding competitively
for targets) and undue pressure on squeezing out synergy gains, goodwill should have a
curvilinear, rather than monotonic impact on acquirer abnormal returns. For targets, using
the logarithmic value of goodwill captures the monotonic impact that the additional
premium should have on pre-announcement share prices.
Using a deal-specific regressor to assess intangible-driven abnormal returns
represents a marked improvement over the more common Tobin’s q (Chen and Jian
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2011). (Q is approximately defined as the inverted book-to-market value [Chung and
Pruitt 1994]). Though its explanatory power is strong for managerial performance (Lang
et. al. 1989), it is not a valid measure for intangible value.
Zeff and Durnham (1997) find a negative correlation between market-to-book
ratios (Tobin’s q) and acquired goodwill for US firms with sales revenue over $1 billion
and a market to book ratio of at least 5. Unless an acquisition is fully cash financed (in
which case crediting cash is matched by debiting goodwill), book value of equity will
increase to accommodate goodwill as the latter is an acquired asset. In this manner, the
acquirer’s book value will more closely resemble its market value (Zeff and Durnham
1997), exerting downwards pressure on q even when the acquirer’s intangible value rises.
Megna and Klock (1993) confirm that q is a poor measure of intangible value in
most high-tech companies. As a firm’s true q (qi’) is fundamentally unobservable
(qi’=MVi/(K1i+K2i) where K1i is a firm i’s tangible and acquired intangible assets and K2i
is a firm’s non-acquired intangible assets), Megna and Klock test whether intangible
assets accurately reflect a firm’s q ratio with the following equation: qi = MVi/K1i = qi’ +
qi’(K2i/ K1i). And as qi’ by definition must equal 1, Tobin’s q is regressed against the
summation of all non-acquired intangibles (capitalized in-process R&D, patent stocks,
etc.): qi = β0 + ∑ βj(K2ji/K1i) + ui (where the summation applies to all j intangibles ranging
from 1 to N). Though the model explained 40% of the variation in q, the insignificant
effect of patent stock (t=0.33) is rather surprising, considering patents comprise around
31% of the total transaction size in high-tech acquisitions (Benoit and Cauthorn 2006).
Therefore, assuming tobin’s q as a valid measure of intangible-driven abnormal returns
should be discouraged.
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Though q breaks down in the case of acquirers, the metric does function as an
accurate measure of a target’s intangible value. This is because market and book value
increase in lockstep to reflect the premium paid on all outstanding shares.
Overall, goodwill reflects the fact that high-tech firms are increasingly situated in
innovation networks and thus profits are no longer derived from linearized product chains
(Blaxill and Eckardt 2009). IP pure-play companies, such as Qualcomm, add a
completely new dimension towards M&A returns analysis by generating revenue solely
through licensing knowledge gained through R&D. In this manner, strategic M&A spend
can become a powerful predictor of future innovative growth (Liu 2005).
Following this further, judicious spending delivers the greatest return when
focused on acquiring complimentary technologies. As per a landmark study by Gao and
Iyer (2006), acquisitions of targets that sell products within adjacent technology stacks
(e.g. services, applications, middleware, systems, and hardware) experience greater longterm returns than those of targets offering products within the same stack as the acquirer.
For example, EMC’s (data storage hardware) purchase of VMware (virtualization
services) and Oracle’s (database management) acquisition of Sun (servers) both led to
statistically significant day 0 abnormal returns (p<0.01; t-statistic of 13.2 and 12.4,
respectively). In both cases, product bundling and cross-selling generated revenue in
excess of the usual building of scale through elimination of redundant R&D costs. This
process of buying inventions through M&A, rather than developing them in-house,
becomes ever more important in an era where high-tech product life-cycles continually
decline (Odilon and Banks 2007).
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In light of this finding, I modify Gao and Iyer’s weighted concentration index to
compare the percentage of sales that each acquirer and target generates within the
services, software/IP licensing, and hardware/industrials domains. The intellectual
property-driven middle layer is filled primary by software, internet (e.g. search, social
media, applications), and IP licensing companies (which represent R&D-heavy
semiconductor and networking/data communication firms); the bottom layer is laden with
industrial companies and products (e.g. data storage systems, servers, networking
infrastructure, semiconductor fabs); and the top layer is comprised of nearly all firms. I
expect increasing subsector concentration to yield lower abnormal returns.
(1) Concentration = AServ*TServ + ASW*TSW + AHW*THW
A = percentage of acquirer sales; T = percentage of target sales
Another problem I hope to remedy is the field’s lack of industry focus. With
goodwill and synergy-related intangibles comprising the majority of purchase price
allocation to any asset category in high-technology M&A (median values of 70% in
internet and 63% in software/services) (PWC 2011), studies applying traditional
performance drivers such as firm size or method of payment, though statistically
significant, do not capture the importance of industry-specific, intangible-driven growth
(Castedello and Klingbeil 2009). By controlling for industry-fixed effects, I aim to better
ascertain post-announcement abnormal returns by industry subsector. My data will only
concern the following four major high-tech subsectors: internet, computers,
networks/data communication, and semiconductors.
Finally, I will control for time fixed effects (year and seasonality [i.e. quarter of
acquisition]). Strong equity markets, a robust economy, and cheap debt financing pushed
M&A deal flow and volume to its highest level since 2002 in Q4 of 2007. The $4 trillion
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in completed M&A easily surpassed the $3.2 trillion mark set in 2000 and 2006. Though
the 2008 financial crisis flushed M&A activity until 2009, 2010 and 2011 faced record
dealmaking thanks in part to rich cash reserves (estimated at $2 trillion), rebounding
market conditions, and low-interest debt financing (Ernst and Young 2011, Wall Street
Journal 2011). Similarly, the S&P North American Technology Sector Index has
continued to deliver record earnings since 2008 (Ernst and Young 2011), giving firms the
flexibility to finance acquisitions through rising equity prices or large cash reserves.
Overall, acquirers are finding it cheaper to purchase earnings through acquisitions rather
than invest their cash in low-yielding fixed income instruments or riskier internal
projects. As a result, 2011 quarterly deal volume and value remain above 80 and $26
billion, respectively, with average transaction size of $320 million (a 19% increase over
2010).
Regardless of annual market trends, seasonality within the tech sector explains the
relatively large value and volume seen in Q3 and Q4 (Acquisitions Monthly 2008). Deal
execution usually rises from November to January as end-of-year sales push up acquirer
stock prices, falls in February, and then holds constant until November (Ernst and Young
2011).
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III. Methodology
Test 1 – Abnormal Return Significance
M&A announcement dates are searched for using LexisNexis, an electronic database
for legal, business, high-tech, and governmental-related information. The first day where
rumors about the acquisition appear in the press is chosen as the M&A announcement
date (day 0). As the first news leak regarding a potential acquisition oftentimes precedes
the official press release by a week (Andrade et al. 2001), I will consider cumulative
abnormal returns over a longer 21-day event window. This is a marked improvement over
most other M&A event studies, which only study a (-1, 0) event window (Table 1, 2) due
to the 1-day lag between coverage in the Wall Street Journal and the official
announcement (Sanders and Zdanowicz 1992). Though this 2-day window captures most
of the abnormal returns (CAR=21.361% [t=6.414]), it leaves out statistically significant
pre-announcement returns (CAR(-10,0)=7.352% [t=4.101]) that are most likely the result
of the week’s earlier news leaks.
With regards to non-public information, although the due diligence process begins
well before any news leak, the impact from insider trading is never well-specified and
will always be reflected in the estimation window. If significant day-0 ARs or CARs are
still realized, then the effect of such illegal activity is minimal. As later seen in the results
section, day 0 ARs are significant for both acquirers and targets.
My sample set consists of 313 acquisitions with average value of $497 million.
All daily stock return data will be sourced from CRSP while all information from
financial statements will be taken from Compustat. Market returns will be taken from the
value-weighted CRSP market index.
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All 313 acquisitions are high-tech M&A transactions involving public US
companies from November 10, 2002 to November 10, 2011. I exclude any transactions
that involve the following: 1) entities announcing splits, dividends, or earnings within the
event window, 2) firms that report missing daily stock returns in the event period, and 3)
firms which share overlapping event windows. The first exclusion is meant to isolate
merger-specific returns, while the second is a practical construct. The third exclusion is
meant to control for cross-sectional AR correlations and will be discussed later in this
section.
The first phase of testing uses short-term event studies to gauge the abnormal return
to targets and acquirers around the M&A announcement date. Most studies calculate
normal returns by benchmarking daily stock returns (calculated as the change in share
price divided by the prior day’s closing share price) against an industry or large-market
index (Bruner 2003), ultimately creating market model-derived OLS regression models:
(2) Rit - Rft = αi + βi(Rmt - Rft) + ARit
(3) ARit = Rit - E(Rit)
In my model, Rft is the risk-free interest rate on 6-month treasuries, αi is a time-fixed,
firm-specific return in excess of the risk-adjusted return, βi is the stock’s beta or volatility
of returns in relation to the market return in excess of the risk free rate (Rmt - Rft), and
ARit is the normally distributed error term, with mean equal to 0, that changes with firm
and time. Beta and alpha are both determined from the daily returns data of the estimation
window.
Regressing past stock returns against a large-market index is the most common event
study methodology used to derive normal returns and will be replicated in this study
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(Bruner 2003, Binder 1998). For short-run event studies, Brown and Warner’s (1980)
conclusion is widely held as true: “Beyond a simple, one-factor market model, there is no
evidence that more complicated methodologies convey any benefits.”
Beyond just a theoretical defense of using a market risk-adjusted beta, in today’s
digital economy high tech stock returns heavily rely on market returns (see literature
review). Enterprise-wide demand for cloud computing services (e.g. ERP, BI, BPO,
CRM) and networking solutions, coupled with consumer-driven demand for mobile
chipsets, have made the market model increasingly relevant (Gaughan 2011). Replacing
the market model by regressing firm returns against returns from either the firm’s
respective industry or a contemporary set of firms is not advised as both are affected by a
related firms’ M&A decision-making (Duso 2010). Furthermore, as SaaS/IaaS services
now cater to all industry verticals, software firms’ revenue becomes dependent on the
health of the overall market. Coupled with horizontal integration across industry
subsectors (e.g. HP [hardware] purchasing Autonomy [software]), the confluence of
mobile, wireless, and the cloud is making M&A decisions more reflective of
macroeconomic, rather than industry-specific, conditions (Gaughan 2011). Gaughan
explicitly states, “M&A volume tends to follow the level of economic activity.”
Because this study assumes that abnormal returns are jointly multivariate normal and
identically and independently distributed (a reasonable assumption as per MacKinlay
1997), excluding acquisitions that share overlapping event windows reduces the risk of
cross-sectional correlation as any M&A related market or industry impact will now be
reflected in the estimation rather than event window used to predict another firm’s
expected return. Similarly, using a large estimation window of 170 days drives sampling
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error of beta and alpha to zero, which reduces the likelihood of pre-event serial
correlation and thus justifies using unconditional abnormal return variance.
The variance of the cross-sectional average of announcement date abnormal returns is
estimated as follows:

(4)
The standard deviation of each firm’s abnormal return is derived from the variance within
its estimation window:

(5)
The estimation window ranges from t= -180 to t = -11 (T=170) and the standard
deviations are summed across all firms (i=1 to i=313) to generate S( AR ). T-d is the
degree of freedom (d=2 due to estimated alpha and beta in equation 1). To calculate the
significance of any day t abnormal return within the event window, a standard t-test is
used, where t= AR t / S( AR t).
As a 21-day event window will also be used, CAR variance must be estimated. Due
to the OLS assumption of independent and identical distributions, the variance of CAR is
simply the summation of each day’s cross-sectional abnormal return variances.
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Test 2 – Abnormal Return Regressions
The second phase of the study develops multiple regression models that attempt to
explain the observed abnormal returns. These models estimate cumulative abnormal
returns as well, as all variables are balance sheet items that do not change on a daily
basis. The multiple regression models and selected variables for acquirers (equation 6)
and targets (equation 7) are listed below:

Relative Size= target market cap/acquirer market cap
Relative Book to Market Value = target book to market value/acquirer book to market
value
Computer = binary variable for software, hardware, and IT services subsector
Semiconductor = binary variable for semiconductor subsector
Network = binary variable for networks and data communication subsector
Q2 = binary variable for second quarter
Q3 = binary variable for third quarter
Q4 = binary variable for fourth quarter
2003 = year 2003 binary variable
2004 = year 2004 binary variable
2005 = year 2005 binary variable
2006 = year 2006 binary variable
2007 = year 2007 binary variable
2008 = year 2008 binary variable
2009 = year 2009 binary variable
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2010 = year 2010 binary variable
2011= year 2011 binary variable

(6) ARit,acquirer = B0 + B1(Cash/Purchase Price)it + B2(Goodwill/Purchase Price)it +
B3(Goodwill/Purchase Price)2it + B4(Relative Size)it + B5(Relative Size)2 it +
B6(Concentration)it + B7(Relative Book to Market Value)it + δ2Computeri +
δ3Semiconductori + δ4Networki + γ2Q2t + γ3Q3t + γ4Q4t + ς22003t + ς32004t + ς42005t +
ς52006t + ς62007t + ς72008t + ς82009t + ς92010t + ς102011t + εit

(7) ARit,target = B0 + B1(Cash/Purchase Price)it + B2(ln(Goodwillit)) + δ2Computeri +
δ3Semiconductori + δ4Networki + γ2Q2t + γ3Q3t + γ4Q4t + ς22003t + ς32004t + ς42005t +
ς52006t + ς62007t + ς72008t + ς82009t + ς92010t + ς102011t + εit

IV. Results & Discussion
As per Table 3 and Graph 2, day 0 abnormal returns were highly significant at the
5% significance level for acquirers (AR=1.23, t=1.97) and 1% level for targets (AR=8.10,
t=12.65). Acquirer returns mirror those of Kohers and Kohers (2000, 2001), who found
CARs of 1.26% (-1,5) and 1.44% (-1,0) compared to CARs of 1.36% and 1.45% for the
same periods (Graph 1 and 2). Thus, the data from 1984-1996 seems to correspond well
with that from 2002 to 2011. The similarity of my and the Kohers and Kohers results
suggests that high-tech acquirers experience significant returns, while those of other
industries tend to have insignificantly positive or negative returns (Table 2).
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Table 3: Abnormal returns (i=313) for acquirers and targets; bottom values reference two-sided tstatistic
Day within Event Window
-10
Acquirer

Target

-9

-8

-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0

0

0

0.45

-0.14

0.01

0.14

0.13

-0.23

0.22

1.23**

0.11

-0.02

-0.13

-0.02

-0.03

0

0.04

0.15

-0.02

-0.02

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.721

-0.224

0.016

0.224

0.208

-0.368

0.352

1.970

0.176

-0.032

-0.208

-0.032

-0.048

0.000

0.064

0.240

-0.032

-0.032

0.01

-0.02
0.0312

-0.07
0.1093

0.01562

0.09

0.11

0.13

0.23

0.32

0.87

1.25**

1.45**

8.10*

1.62**

0.92

0.47

0.14056

0.17179

0.20303

0.3592

0.49976

1.35871

1.95217

2.26452

12.6501

2.53001

1.4368

0.73402

0.11

0.05

0.16

0.07

0.02

0

0.17179

0.07809

0.24988

0.10932

0.03123

0

* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.1
Graph 1: Abnormal returns (i=313) during event window (t=-10,10); blue=target, red=acquirer

Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns (i=313) for acquirers and targets; parenthetical values
reference two-sided t-statistic

Event Window
(-10,10) (-10,-1) (-5,-1) (-5,5)
Acquirer 1.87

Target

(-1,1)

(1,5)

(1,10)
0.06

0.58

0.27

1.41

1.56

-0.09

(0.65)

(0.29)

(0.19)

(0.68)

(1.44)

(-0.06) (0.03)

15.89*

4.44**

4.12*

15.27* 11.17*

(5.42)

(2.19)

(2.88)

(7.19)

3.05** 3.35***

(10.07) (2.13)

(1.65)

* p<0.01, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.1
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Graph 2: Cumulative abnormal returns (i=313) during event window (t=-10,10); blue=acquirer,
red=target

The day 0 pop of 1.23% is the only significant abnormal return (at 5% level). As
no other acquirer CARs were significant at even 10%, it seems the market efficiently
reacts to the first public information regarding the M&A transaction. Due to acquirer
CAR insignificance, only the day 0 AR will be used in the acquirer multiple regression
models.
In line with much of the event-study literature base, targets possess statistically
significant CARs for every selected window (Table 4), yet most surprising are the
significant abnormal returns of 1.25%, 1.45%, and 1.62% on days -2,-1, and 1. The
significant 2.70% run-up starting two days before the event date casts uncertainty over
the day when information regarding the deal first becomes public. But as 99.04% of
sampled firms experienced their largest abnormal return on their respective
announcement date, the event date seems correctly specified. The day-0 AR peak in
graph 1 comprises 75% of the (-2,0) CAR.
In relation to firms in other industries, the tech targets shared similar returns.
Relative to a (-5,-1) CAR ranging from 16.9-20.8% (Bruner 2003), my sample set
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experienced a 15.27% CAR (Table 4). 2 day CARs (-1,0) were 9.55%, fitting
comfortably within the 8.56-10.14% range found in prior studies (Table 1).
Because most event studies rely on markets immediately adjusting to all public
information, the target firms’ significant pre-announcement CARs in the (-10,-1), (-5,-1),
and (-2,-1) windows – which hint at information leakage and/or insider trading – erode
the true day-0 return. Andrade et al. (2001), Dodd (1980), and Duso et al. (2010) confirm
that individuals with access to private information are usually responsible for significant
pre-announcement CARs up to 10 days prior to the event due to the increased likelihood
of deal closure.
More disturbing is the positive post-announcement drift. With significant CARs
of 3.05% and 3.35% for the (1,5) and (1,10) event windows, respectively, insider trading
is no longer an explanation. Rather, because so few understand the intricacies of
enterprise and consumer IT, investors may overreact following M&A announcements
(Daniel et al. 1998, Kohers and Kohers 2001). With public companies such as Pandora,
Yelp, and Zynga all running negative EBIDTA values, deriving a DCF-based enterprise
value or a comparables-based EV/EBIDTA multiple is meaningless. If traditional Wall
Street valuation methods do not work, then it is no surprise that investors defer to
whatever technology receives the most hype. Interestingly, because behavioral finance
and EMH are not mutually exclusive (Malkiel 2011), overreaction does not entail market
inefficiency.
As many public tech targets are small-cap firms with few outstanding shares
(Kohers and Kohers 2001), bid-ask spreads and commissions are large (Stoll and Whaley
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1983, Bernard and Thomas 1989). As a result, transaction costs and short selling
limitations (due to scarcity of shares) may delay correcting investor overreaction.
It is possible that drift may continue for months after the public announcement
(Bernard and Thomas 1989), but as the goal of this paper is to explain abnormal returns
within short-term event windows, analysis of long-term CARs is left as a future exercise.
Although most target CARs are significant at 1%, adjusting for serial correlation
could have adjusted the return volatility upwards as the returns may have been affected
by hidden, intra-window drift. But even with such adjustments, Reinganum (1982) and
Brown and Warner (1985) find minimal impact on the significance of abnormal returns,
with the latter study concluding that “autocorrelation in the residuals is…small[sic] and
appears to pose little problem for event studies.” (1985) Table 5 shows the 1st, 2nd, and
3rd-order lag autocorrelations for acquirers and targets; all residual autocorrelations are
insignificant, falling within 95% of 0. As a result, an event study method based on OLS
regression and standard parametric tests remains well-specified.
Table 5: Autocorrelation plot; parenthetical values reference two-sided t-statistic

1st order lag
2nd order lag
3rd order lag

Acquirer

Target

0.063
(0.014)
-0.289
(-0.063)
-0.085
(-0.019)

0.285
(0.062)
0.154
(0.033)
0.021
(0.005)

Finally, as daily stock returns may have non gaussian distributions, it is
worrisome that so many event studies assume normality due to large sample size
selection (Bruner 2003). Given that a stock has unlimited upside but is constrained to a 100% loss, a right-skewed distribution could be likely. With tech stocks, the probability
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of disruptive inventions (Google Search) or resignation to legacy systems (Sun servers)
creates fat-tailed distributions that may render AR normality assumptions incorrect.
Residual non-normality could arise from a multitude of non-merger (albeit
financial) announcements during the estimation window that are difficult to discover. For
example, Jackson et al. (2006) modified a normally distributed 250-element AR vector by
adding an “event blip” to the first 6 periods, and then adding the modified vector to a
250-element S&P 500 daily returns vector. When these returns were regressed against a
well-specified model that accounted for the modification, the distribution was almost
normal (average skewness=0, average kurtosis=3), but when regressed against the market
model, the Jarque-Bera test rejected the hypothesis that the residuals are normally
distributed in 96% of the cases; in the well-specified model, only 6.5% of the residuals
were rejected (Jackson et al. 2006).
Though alarming, adjusting for non-normality would most likely require
reclassifying most non-day 0 ARs and CARs as slightly less significant. Brown and
Warner (1985) concur, stating that “the nonnormality of individual-security daily-return
residuals has little effect on the inferences drawn from the use of the t-test."
The significance of target CARs and day 0 abnormal returns for targets and acquirers
allows further analysis by regressing the returns against various regressors. Two
regressors, relative size and relative book to market value, are derived from the data
represented in table 6. Because no target had a book to market value greater than 100%,
no transactions were undertaken to acquire firms nearing bankruptcy.
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Table 6: Mean Equity Values (millions of dollars)
Acquirer

Target

Market Value
(mean, millions)

41878

2,567

Book Value
(mean, millions)

6979

713

Table 7: Subsector Distribution (percentage)
Subsector Distribution

Acquirer

Target

8%

7%

Computer

46%

39%

Internet

36%

47%

Networking

10%

7%

Semiconductor

Table 7 highlights that most acquirers belonged to the computer subsector and
most targets to the internet subsector. This relationship is logical, as web 2.0 (i.e. the
social internet) prompts closer interaction between application developers and larger
software and hardware vendors. Alternately, the internet subsector is younger than the
computer subsector, thus a fewer number and a higher concentration of earlier stage firms
dominate the former.
The sampling data in table 8 closely resemble the data for all high-technology
transactions during the 2002-2011 period. 2007 had the strongest year in 21st century tech
M&A deal flow and volume, followed by 2011, 2002, 2006, and then 2010. The
sampling data follows a similar trend, with 2007 leading with 63 acquisitions (average
transaction size of $645 million and total deal volume of $40.6 billion), 2011 following
with 47 ($532 million, $25 billion), 2002 with 41 ($660 million, $27 billion), 2006 with
33 ($387 million, $12.8 billion), and 2010 with 29 ($435 million, $12.6 billion).
On a side note, assuming that the subsector dummies correlate with the
goodwill/purchase price regressors (as per the 2011 PWC study) may not be true.
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Average goodwill percentage per transaction during 2006 and 2010 was 45% and 47%,
respectively, even though most of the sampled deals in 2010 involved semiconductor
companies.
2010 also had the second highest percentage of purchase price paid out in cash
(72%), while 2006 had the least (37%). Because the 2008 financial crash was preceded
by a robust US economy, firms most likely used overpriced securities to fund
transactions. This seems logical, as average cash percentage in 2008 was 67%.
Table 8: Summary Statistics
Goodwill

Year

Frequency

Average
Transaction
Value
(millions of
dollars)

2002

41

660

27060

46%

277.2

46%

2003

28

432

12096

43%

185.76

42%

2004

26

389

10114

45%

159.49

36%

2005

27

354

9558

43%

120.36

33%

2006

33

387

12771

37%

178.02

45%

2007

63

645

40635

45%

341.85

57%

2008

8

240

1920

67%

50.4

19%

2009

11

354

3894

66%

109.74

33%

2010

29

435

12615

72%

195.75

47%

2011

47

532

25004

74%

287.28

53%

Total

313

497

15567

54%

190.59

41%
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Table 9: Multiple regression models for acquirer day 0 abnormal returns

A1
β Significance
Constant

1.95

Cash/Purchase
x
Price
Goodwill/Purchase
x
Price
Goodwill/Purchase
x
Price2

Β

A2
Significance

β

A3
Significance

Β

A4
Significance

Β

A5
Significance

1%

1.73

1%

1.56

1%

1.08

1%

0.96

1%

x

x

x

0.28

5%

0.25

5%

0.24

5%

x

0.21

1%

0.21

1%

0.20

1%

0.20

1%

x

-0.003

1%

-0.003

1%

-0.003

1%

-0.003

1%

Relative Size

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

0.05

NS

2

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

-0.001

NS

Relative Size

Concentration

-1.74

1%

-1.65

1%

-1.65

1%

-1.64

1%

-1.64

1%

Relative Book to
Market Value

x

x

x

x

x

x

0.36

1%

0.36

1%

Computer

0.27

5%

0.21

5%

0.21

5%

0.22

5%

0.22

5%

Semiconductor -0.14

5%

-0.15

5%

-0.13

5%

-0.13

5%

-0.12

5%

Network

-0.12

5%

-0.15

5%

-0.15

5%

-0.14

5%

-0.14

5%

Q2

0.04

NS

0.03

NS

0.03

NS

0.03

NS

0.03

NS

Q3

0.12

NS

0.15

NS

0.13

NS

0.13

NS

0.11

NS

Q4

0.36

5%

0.25

10%

0.24

10%

0.22

10%

0.21

10%

2003

0.03

NS

0.02

NS

0.04

NS

0.05

NS

0.05

NS

2004

0.07

NS

0.04

NS

0.05

NS

0.05

NS

0.04

NS

2005

0.14

NS

0.12

NS

0.12

NS

0.11

NS

0.11

NS

2006

0.15

NS

0.13

NS

0.11

NS

0.11

NS

0.12

NS

2007

0.28

5%

0.22

10%

0.18

10%

0.18

10%

0.17

10%

2008

0.08

NS

0.13

NS

0.04

NS

0.04

NS

0.04

NS

2009

0.22

10%

0.21

10%

0.13

10%

0.11

10%

0.13

10%

2010

0.44

1%

0.38

1%

0.12

10%

0.11

10%

0.12

10%

2011

0.54

1%

0.46

1%

0.32

5%

0.33

5%

0.33

5%

i (firms)

313

313

313

313

313

F-statistic

4.92

6.35

8.31

11.95

11.23

R2-adjusted

0.17

0.24

0.31

0.41

0.42

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012

29

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Table 10: Multiple regression model for target cumulative abnormal returns and day 0 abnormal
return; goodwill is measured in $USD millions.

Target

Day 0
Significance

CAR(-10,10)
Target
Significance

CAR(-5,5)
Target
Significance

Target

CAR(-1,1)
Significance

Constant

0.87

1%

0.98

1%

0.93

1%

1.14

Cash/Purchase Price

1.08

1%

1.88

1%

2.11

1%

1.45

1%
1%

ln(goodwill)

1.23

1%

2.65

1%

2.53

1%

1.78

1%

Computer

0.17

10%

0.15

10%

0.16

10%

0.16

10%

Semiconductor

-0.16

10%

-0.17

10%

-0.17

10%

-0.16

10%

Network

-0.15

10%

-0.15

10%

-0.16

10%

-0.15

10%

Q2

0.07

NS

0.07

NS

0.07

NS

0.06

NS

Q3

0.12

NS

0.12

NS

0.13

NS

0.12

NS

Q4

0.14

NS

0.13

NS

0.14

NS

0.14

NS

2003

0.05

NS

0.05

NS

0.05

NS

0.05

NS

2004

0.04

NS

0.03

NS

0.03

NS

0.02

NS

2005

0.11

NS

0.12

NS

0.12

NS

0.11

NS

2006

0.13

NS

0.14

NS

0.14

NS

0.14

NS

2007

0.16

10%

0.17

10%

0.17

10%

0.15

10%

2008

0.05

NS

0.06

NS

0.06

NS

0.04

NS

2009

0.22

10%

0.21

10%

0.22

10%

0.21

10%

2010

0.31

5%

0.29

5%

0.31

5%

0.31

5%

2011

0.34

5%

0.32

5%

0.31

5%

0.33

5%

i (firms)

313

313

313

313

F-statistic

54.95

32.23

15.39

21.21

0.75

0.63

0.44

0.52

2

R -adjusted

Summary of Multiple Regression Model Results
The results for acquirer day-0 ARs and target CARs are very promising. Model
A5 explains 42% of the variance in day 0 acquirer ARs (F=11.23), while the day 0 target
AR model explains 75% of the target’s day 0 AR variance (F=54.95). For targets and
acquirers, the industry subsector to which the firm belongs to as well as the year in which
the transaction takes place (provided its 2007 or after the 2008 financial crisis) are
significant for every model. The percentage of the acquisition financed by cash and the
purchase price premium are significant for both types of firms too.
Surprises in the acquirer models include the insignificance of the nonlinear
“relative size” regressor, but great predictive power of the concentration index and
relative book to market ratios. In fact, my modified concentration index and AR models
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explain more of the day 0 AR variance than the models developed by Gao and Iyer. For
targets, almost all regressors maintained very similar explanatory powers across different
models. This implies that most firms that had large/small day 0 abnormal returns also had
large/small event window CARs.

Concentration Index
Due to the massive product upselling and R&D synergies that can be realized by
combining firms in different layers of the technology stack, I expected the concentration
index to be a major arbiter in acquirer ARs. By expanding the software-specific
concentration index Gao and Iyer used in their AR regression models to include services
(top), intangible capital-heavy firms (middle), and tangible capital-heavy firms (bottom),
I developed a concentration index that was significant at the 1% level for all models. The
Gao and Iyer (2006) concentration index was significant at 5%. And where the Gao and
Iyer adjusted-R2 and F-statistic were 0.24 and 4.21 respectively, the Model A5 R2 and Fstatistic were 0.42 and 11.23. My concentration index regressor seems stronger at
predicting an acquirer’s AR, but more importantly, my multiple regression models
explain a greater proportion of the AR distribution. Although interesting, the disparity of
our datasets makes direct comparison difficult.

Cash
The percentage of the transaction paid out in cash was significant at 5% for
acquirer AR models (Table 9) and at 1% for targets CARs (Table 10). With an adjusted
R2 increase of 0.7 over Model A2 (Table 9) and limited impact on the other continuous
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independent variables, inclusion of the cash regressor allows Model A3 to explain a
greater proportion of the variance of day 0 acquirer abnormal returns.
This finding contrasts with the Kohers and Kohers high-tech event studies (2000,
2001), which found deal financing to be insignificant in M&A transactions. Though my
dataset samples acquisitions starting from 2002 (as opposed to the 1980s and 1990s), it is
difficult to determine whether timeliness is the main reason for discrepancy.
For targets, non-cash payments may return lower CARs because they entail
negotiation initiated by bidders that is not specified in early news leaks (Bouwman 2004).
Examples include deciding on the voting status of newly issued shares or whether to use
a fixed or floating share exchange ratio. But as negotiation can ultimately favor either
party, it seems more likely that the immediacy of capital gains taxes on cash necessitates
higher premiums (Asquith 1990).
For bidders, cash transactions are faster to execute and usually signal a
competitive M&A environment (Asquith 1990). Acquisitions are highly valued in such
settings and may explain bidders’ higher abnormal returns. In addition, stock-based
transactions hint that bidder shares are overpriced, and given all else equal, adjusts
returns downwards (Bouwman 2004). The declining coefficients in years 2007-2011 in
Model A3 relative to Model A2 indicate that many deals during that time period were
financed with cash (Table 9). In fact, after the 2008 financial crisis, depleted equity prices
meant that only companies with strong cash reserves could acquire targets (Ernst and
Young 2011). Cash comprised between 37-46% of transaction values in between 20022007, but around 66-74% in between 2008-2011 (Table 8).
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Industry Subsector
The high-technology subsector dummy was significant at 5% in all five acquirer
models (Table 9) and at 10% in all target models (Table 10). Given all else is equal,
acquirers and targets within the computer and internet subsectors consistently received
higher abnormal returns than those within the semiconductor and networking sectors.
Because tangible capital comprises a large percentage of total assets within
semiconductor and networking companies, purchase price premiums must naturally be
less than those in the other two sectors.
This idea is explicitly demonstrated in Table 9, where inclusion of the goodwill
regressor decreases the computer dummy coefficient, but slightly increases the
coefficients of semi and networking dummies. The positive correlation between purchase
price premium and the computer and internet subsectors found in Table 9 is corroborated
by PricewaterhouseCoopers, which found that acquirers in both sectors paid median
premiums northwards of 60% in 2011. But even after adjusting for goodwill, all
subsector dummies remain significant at 5% (Table 9) or 10% (Table 10), demonstrating
that filtering ARs along industry-specific dimensions for both acquirers and targets is
crucial for future event studies.

Goodwill
The contribution of the purchase price premium (i.e. goodwill/acquired
intangibles as a percentage of the purchase price) is significant at 1% for both acquirer
and target ARs. For acquirers, goodwill has a significant curvilinear impact on abnormal
returns (Table 9) and starts negatively impacting acquirer returns once premiums reach
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64.5% (Model A5). So although my results confirm the 2011 PWC suggestion that
premiums may differ by subsector, my results disagree about the median purchase price
premiums of each subsector.
Interestingly, the inclusion of the nonlinear goodwill component in Model 2A
generates a less negative concentration index regressor. This implies a negative
correlation between both variables, as companies that acquiring targets located at polar
ends of the tech stack can realize greater synergies from merging. This allows higher
purchase price premiums to be paid.
As expected, the logarithmic value of the actual goodwill amount is strongly
correlated with target ARs and CARs (Table 10).
More importantly, this paper represents the first use of goodwill in analyzing
high-tech acquirer abnormal returns and shows its statistical significance in explaining
acquirer returns.

Relative Size
Though the relative size between targets and acquirers was insignificant (Table 9),
its inclusion did increase the adjusted-R2 by 0.01; thus, Model A5 was not eliminated.
This is rather surprising as prior studies show that a target to acquirer market cap ratio in
excess of 10% can boost acquirer ARs by 2.4% (Asquith et al. 1983). Even though the
Asquith dataset samples dissimilar firms from 1963-79, by just looking at the relative size
function, each percentage uptick (i.e. unit increase; all variables are percentages) should
increase the acquirer’s AR until the relative size variable equals 50%, after which point
the regressor will negatively impact ARs. This makes sense, as a 50% target to acquirer
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market cap ratio is just a merger of equals. But given the contribution from all the other
regressors, the absolute impact of the function on the acquirer’s AR is insignificant.

Relative Book to Market
The relative book to market ratio (B/M) was significant at 1%. Whenever the
acquirer’s market-to-book value is larger than the target’s (i.e. a high relative book to
market ratio), investors view the acquisition as a well-managed acquirer buying a poorlymanaged target (Lang et al. 1989). If this is true, firms should experience higher day 0
abnormal returns as synergies should be quickly realized. But such managerial efficiency
also has a downside. Oftentimes, companies with fast-rising share prices become
overconfident and overpay for targets (Roll 1986). This is demonstrated in Model A4,
where the statistically significant B/M ratio is positively correlated with the purchase
price premium.

Seasonality
With respect to seasonality, only Q4 provides significant abnormal returns in
every acquirer AR model (Table 9). This may be explained by investors looking for firms
with rising end-of-year sales to make advantageous acquisitions that earlier were
financially unfeasible (Ernst and Young 2011). When goodwill is introduced in Model
A2, the Q4 coefficient becomes less significant (p<0.1 instead of p<0.05), meaning that
goodwill explained at least some portion of Q4’s impact on day 0 AR in Model A1
(Table 9). Basically, when profits are high, premiums tend to follow.
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None of the multiple regression models for targets displayed a significant
seasonality effect.

Year
Though the coefficients for successive years are rising, 2007 and 2009-2011 are
the only years with significant betas in all acquirer AR (Table 9) and target CAR models
(Table 10). Though 2002-2006 and 2007 shared a similarly strong economy, 2007 had
the greatest purchase price premium (57% as per Table 8). As expected, inclusion of
goodwill in Model A2 dropped the 2007 coefficient from 0.28 to 0.22 and reduced its
significance from p<0.05 to p<0.1 (Table 9). Goodwill was also positively correlated
with 2010 (47%) and 2011 (53%), but the explanatory power of both dummy variables
dropped when the “cash as a percentage of purchase price” regressor was introduced
(Table 9) as both years had upwards of 70% of deal financing done in cash.
Though 2008 may suffer from a small sample size, its changing coefficient in the
acquirer AR models is very interesting. Conservative M&A dealflow and depressed
premiums boosted the 2008 dummy variable’s coefficient from 0.08 (Model A1) to 0.13
(Model A2), but as cash payments are positively correlated with the 2008 regressor, the
coefficient declined from 0.13 (Model A2) to 0.04 (Model A3).
For all target CARs, the years 2007 and 2009 are significant at the 10% level and
the years 2010-2011 are significant at 5% (Table 10). Because 2007, 2010, 2011
comprised 45% of all sampled deals, acquirers may have been pressured to acquire firms
just to keep up with their competitors (Harford 2004). In the frenzy to buy appreciating
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target shares, investors may have bid up prices without fully considering goodwill,
method of payment, or probability of deal closure.

IV. Conclusion
This paper aimed to discover whether high-tech M&A transactions generated
value for acquirers and targets, and if so, determine what factors contributed to that value
creation. Using an event study method, I found that acquirers and targets both realized
statistically significant day 0 ARs (with targets experiencing significant CARs as well).
After developing multiple regression models that explained nearly 42% of the variance in
day 0 acquirer ARs and 75% of the target’s day 0 AR variance, I realized how important
purchase price premiums, industry subsector dummy variables, and concentration within
the technology industry are. Though this paper updates the historically pre-21st century
data used in event studies, focuses on the undercovered high-tech sector, and makes key
refinements to AR and CAR multiple regression models, there are still many areas of
future work.
Expanding the study to test returns for firms that have already interacted through
prior alliances or have longstanding M&A expertise, would give a better sense of how
efficiently synergies would be realized. Determining technological complementarity in
terms of R&D, rather than just revenue, is also critical in accelerating a product’s time to
market. Finally, ascertaining the type of M&A deal (e.g., acquiring a firm due to industry
consolidation or merging to expand sales internationally) and including the deal binary
variables within the acquirer models might enhance the models’ predictive powers.
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